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Abstract This paper provides empirical evidence on two potential costs of shared
ownership of German affiliates abroad. First, in periods of currency crises, wholly-
owned affiliates, in contrast to partially-owned affiliates, seem to circumvent
financial constraints by accessing capital from their parent companies. In terms of
differences in performance regarding sales of both types of firms, wholly-owned
affiliates have a significantly better sales performance than partially-owned affiliates
in periods of crises. This finding contributes to the evidence that FDI helps in
mitigating the negative consequences of sharp currency depreciation, and stresses
that this effect works especially through capital inflows to wholly-owned affiliates.
Second, the debt financing of partially-owned affiliates is less sensitive to the tax
rate suggesting that partially-owned affiliates rely less on international debt shifting
than wholly-owned affiliates. This indicates that partially-owned affiliates are less
flexible to exploit tax efficient strategies.
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1 Introduction
This paper examines the debt financing behaviour of partially-owned and wholly-
owned German affiliates abroad throughout periods of sharp currency depreciation
(currency crises) in the host economies, and compares the differences between both
types of affiliates in relying on international debt shifting.
There are two main findings. First, the results indicate that wholly-owned
affiliates, in contrast to partially-owned affiliates, can circumvent financial
constraints during periods of sharp currency depreciation by accessing capital from
their parent companies and related parties. The ratio of loans granted from a German
parent company to total assets of a wholly-owned affiliate increases by about 2%
points during years of sharp currency depreciation in emerging markets. Meanwhile,
this ratio is lower by about 2.5% points in the case of partially-owned affiliates
during episodes of currency crises. Decomposing the partial ownership structure
into minority and majority-owned affiliates shows that the negative effect on the
loan ratio is more pronounced in the case of minority-owned affiliates. With regards
to differences in sales of both types of firms, the evidence suggests that sales of
partially-owned affiliates decline in periods of crises, while wholly-owned affiliates
manage to keep their sales unaltered.
Second, the results suggest that wholly-owned affiliates rely more on debt
shifting than partially-owned affiliates. Particularly, a 10% increase in the corporate
tax rate in emerging markets increases the ratio of total debt to total asset of wholly-
owned affiliates by about 27% points. However, for partially-owned and minority-
owned affiliates, we cannot find evidence on debt shifting responses to higher tax
rates. This is also true in the sample of affiliates operating in OECD countries
suggesting that the ownership structure matters for tax planning and debt policy of
affiliates not only in emerging markets but also in advanced economies.
These findings are linked to two branches in the literature: the literature on the
costs of shared ownership and the literature on the effects of sharp depreciations and
currency crises. Theoretical and empirical studies that address the costs of sharing
the ownership of the affiliate emphasise aspects such as coordination costs and the
cost of shared control rights and technology; Desai et al. (2004), Ramachandran
(1993), and Grossman and Hart (1986). Furthermore, costs of shared ownership
arise with regard to shifting taxable profit from high tax to low tax rate countries.
For instance, Weichenrieder (2009) finds that a change in the tax rate has a larger
impact on the profitability of wholly-owned than partially-owned German affiliates.
Desai et al. (2004) find a similar effect for US affiliates.
In this context, our results point out to two new potential costs of shared
ownership. The first finding indicates that accommodating the financial needs of
multinational affiliates is easier when the parent enjoys full control over the affiliate.
In periods of currency crises it is more difficult for partially-owned affiliates to
access capital from parent companies than wholly-owned affiliates. The second
finding on debt shifting experiences suggests that multinational firms engage in
worldwide tax planning not only with respect to profit shifting but also with respect
to debt policy. However, the reaction of partially-owned affiliates is not consistent
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with international debt shifting. This result is a new evidence that partially-owned
affiliates are less inclined to be shaped in a tax efficient way.1
The effects of sharp depreciations and currency crises are examined in the
literature by focusing on various aspects. A macroeconomic aspect includes for
example studies that investigate the response of macroeconomic variables such as
output and the current account to currency depreciations (Gupta et al. 2007). A
microeconomic aspect concentrates on financial issues such as the foreign exchange
exposure of the firm and corporate financial policies around periods of sharp
depreciation (Bris and Koskinen 2002; Bris et al. 2004). There are recent attempts,
to which this paper belongs, to use data at the firm level to provide microeconomic
evidence on ideas that have macroeconomic interpretations. For example, Desai
et al. (2008) compare the reaction of US affiliates with local firms to currency
depreciations, and conclude that US affiliates, in contrast to local firms, expand their
activities after sharp depreciations. This finding supports the idea that foreign direct
investment (FDI) tends to mitigate the negative effect of a sharp depreciation or the
severity of a currency crises. As an explanation for their finding, Desai et al. (2008)
provide evidence for the hypothesis that foreign affiliates overcome financial
constraints through internal capital markets with the parent companies. These
results are connected to the rich literature on the positive effects of FDI on host
economy firms through channels such as technology spillover as for example in
Keller and Yeaple (2009).2 Alvarez and Go¨rg (2007) consider a distinct but related
issue of employment response of multinational subsidiaries and local firms in a
period of economic slowdown in Chile, and find no evidence on differential
reactions between both types of firms.
In conjunction with this literature, our results contribute to the evidence that FDI
helps in mitigating the negative consequences of sharp currency depreciations.
Moreover, the results put forth that the effect works especially through inflows of
loans from parent companies and related parties to wholly-owned affiliates. This is
an indication of a negative effect of restricting foreign ownership of the affiliates by
the law of the host economy.
This paper proceeds as follows: In Sect. 2, we describe the data, identify episodes
of sharp currency depreciation and provide descriptive statistics. We present our
empirical results in Sect. 3 and conclude in Sect. 4.
2 Data, depreciation episodes and descriptive statistics
2.1 Data and depreciation episodes
This study employs the Deutsche Bundesbank MiDi data set on the German
outbound FDI. This firm-level data set contains information on private, publicly
1 While the focus in this paper is to compare differences between both types of affiliates, other studies
examine the determinants of the ownership decision. For example, Raff et al. (2009) stress the role of firm
productivity in the ownership decision and provide evidence from Japanese multinational firms.
Kesternich and Schnitzer (2009) find that the ownership share depends negatively on political risks.
2 See Smeets (2009) and Go¨rg and Greenaway (2004) for a survey.
Debt financing and sharp currency depreciations 283
123
traded and government-owned German affiliates abroad. The foreign trade and
payments regulation oblige all German firms investing abroad and satisfying the
reporting requirements to report several key balance sheet items of their affiliates
abroad. We concentrate on firms in manufacturing industries and exclude banks,
financial and non-profit institutions. To correct for changes in the reporting
requirements for German investors during the sample period, we drop all affiliates
that are characterised by a total balance sheet of less than five million euro and
discard affiliates that do not exist for at least three consecutive years.3 The final full
sample spans from 1996 to 2006 and contains observations on 106,809 German
affiliates in 55 countries (on average 9,710 affiliates per year).
Since a prime interest in this paper is the impact of currency crises on the debt
behaviour of affiliates, a sample of emerging markets is required. Also, in
examining the power of taxation in explaining the debt policy of affiliates, it is
constructive to distinguish between those affiliates located in OECD countries and
those in emerging markets. Therefore, we obtain two sub-samples by restricting the
full sample to either include only emerging markets or only OECD countries. We
identify emerging markets as those economies that are classified as middle income
economies by the World Bank and for which we have information on German
affiliates. Hence, the sample of emerging markets contains observations on 28,178
German affiliates in 31 countries (on average 2,562 affiliates per year) whereas the
OECD sample contains observations on 87,099 German affiliates. Both sub-
samples, like the full sample, span from 1996 to 2006.
Data on statutory corporate income tax rates have been taken from Mintz and
Weichenrieder (2010), PricewaterhouseCoopers and KPMG. The source of
macroeconomic variables is the International Financial Statistics of the International
Monetary Fund. In computing the nominal exchange rates between the euro and the
national currencies for the period before 1999, we employ the exchange rate of the
ECU (European Currency Unit) vis-a`-vis the Deutsche Mark. The real exchange rate
between the euro and the currency of the host economy is obtained by deflating the
nominal rate by the ratio of the German producer price index to the producer price
index of the host economy.4
We identify real depreciation episodes (currency crises) in emerging markets as
follows:
crisisn;t ¼ 1 if RERn;t RER
average
n þ 2  STDðREERnÞ
0 else

ð1Þ
The subscripts n and t are a country and a time index, respectively. The depreciation
dummy is equal to one if the change in the real exchange rate (RER) is greater than
or equal to its country mean times double its standard deviation (STD) for the period
1990–2007. Otherwise, the depreciation dummy takes the value zero. This method
is in line with the identification methods used in the literature on currency crises.5
3 See Lipponer (2008) for details on the reporting requirements and the MiDi data set.
4 The producer price index is not available for five countries. In these cases, we use the consumer price
index.
5 See Laeven and Valencia (2008), Kaminsky et al. (1998), and Frankel and Rose (1996).
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It captures well-known years of sharp currency depreciation such as 1998 in Russia,
1999 in Brazil and 2002 in Argentina. Table 6 in the appendix displays a list of the
identified years of depreciation.
2.2 Descriptive statistics
The degree of ownership of an affiliate is computed in the MiDi data set based upon
the actual share of the parent firm in nominal capital of the affiliate. If this share is
100%, we consider the affiliate to be wholly-owned. Otherwise, the affiliate is
considered to be partially-owned. In our regression analysis, we make a further
distinction among partially-owned affiliates between minority-owned, characterised
by a participation share of less than 50%, and majority-owned, characterised by a
participation share of greater than 50% but less than 100%.
Table 1 displays the number of affiliates and summary statistics of variables used
in our econometric analysis. Considering the sample of all countries, 75% of the
affiliates are wholly-owned while 25% are partially-owned. In the sample of
emerging markets, about 64.5% of the affiliates are wholly-owned while 35.5% are
partially-owned. In OECD countries partially-owned affiliates constitute about 22%
of total affiliates. Further, Table 1 reveals that with respect to the ratio of total debt
or sales there are no substantial differences between both types of affiliates or
between affiliates across countries.6 However, the ratio of loans from parent
companies tends to be lower for partially-owned affiliates than for wholly-owned
affiliates. The average statutory corporate tax rates faced by both types of firms are
almost identical.
German multinational firms are increasingly relying on establishing wholly-
owned affiliates to carry out their operations abroad rather than partially-owned
affiliates. Considering the entire sample, panel (a) of Fig. 1 shows that the
percentage of wholly-owned affiliates has increased from 70% in 1996 to about 80%
in 2006.7 This pattern is consistent with that reported in Desai et al. (2004) for US
firms. Panels (b) and (c) of Fig. 1 demonstrate that this pattern is observed in
emerging markets and in OECD countries. The percentage of partially-owned
affiliates has decreased from about 46% in 1996 to 30% in 2006 in emerging
markets (panel b) and from 25% in 1996 to 18% in 2006 in OECD countries
(panel c).
Figure 2 illustrates the pattern of wholly versus partially-owned affiliates across
sectors. One important message from Fig. 2 is that we do not observe a pattern of
clustering of partially-owned affiliates only in one sector and wholly-owned
affiliates only in another sector. In the sample including all countries, the percentage
of partially-owned affiliates is between 22 and 30% in all sectors. One exception is
the wholesale trade sector. In emerging markets the percentage of partially-owned
6 We correct for outliers by excluding affiliates characterised by a total debt ratio above the 98th
percentile. These are observations with extreme values of negative equity.
7 Since the key point to be made is the access of affiliates to loans from their parent companies in
Germany, we consider affiliates that are owned by two or more German parents as wholly-owned
affiliates.
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affiliates across sectors is between 37 and 48% (panel b) whereas it is lower in
OECD countries (panel c).
3 Empirical results
3.1 Financing multinational affiliates during periods of sharp currency
depreciations
Sharp currency depreciations affect firms in many ways. A depreciation of the
currency of the host economy makes the products of exporting firms more
competitive in the international markets supporting exports.8 Hence, exporting
firms, whether domestic or multinational, may seek to obtain additional debt finance
for expansion. Meanwhile, importing firms may not be able to fully pass through the
Table 1 Descriptive statistics, 1996–2006
Wholly-owned affiliates
All countries Emerging markets OECD countries
Number of affiliates
Percent
80106
75%
18161
64.5%
67937
78%
Mean STD Mean STD Mean STD
Total debt ratio 0.53 0.29 0.52 0.29 0.53 0.29
Debt from parent ratio 0.13 0.21 0.14 0.21 0.13 0.21
Log of sales 8.90 3.54 9.24 2.81 8.90 3.54
Log of employment 4.5 1.47 4.8 1.41 4.5 1.61
Corporate tax rate 0.33 0.06 0.28 0.06 0.34 0.06
Partially-owned affiliates
All countries Emerging markets OECD countries
Number of affiliates
Percent
26703
25%
10017
35.5%
19162
22%
Mean STD Mean STD Mean STD
Total debt ratio 0.51 0.29 0.49 0.28 0.52 0.29
Debt from parent ratio 0.06 0.14 0.06 0.14 0.05 0.14
Log of sales 8.83 3.42 9.22 2.72 8.65 3.69
Log of employment 4.7 1.59 5.2 1.41 4.4 1.61
Corporate tax rate 0.32 0.06 0.30 0.06 0.35 0.06
Source MiDi data set
8 Forbes (2002) compares the performance of firms in economies that did not experience depreciation
episodes with those located in economies that did experience depreciations without distinguishing
between multinational and domestic firms. The results suggest that particularly firms with foreign sales
exposure outperform those with low foreign sales exposure.
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decrease in the value of the domestic currency to domestic prices leading to
financial unease and a need for funds.9 At the same time, many sharp depreciations,
or currency crises, are associated with domestic credit crunches and banking crises
causing difficulties in accessing capital from the host market. This ‘‘twin crisis’’
9 See Campa and Goldberg (2005) for empirical evidence and Goldberg and Knetter (1997) for a
literature survey on incomplete exchange rate pass-through.
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phenomenon is stressed by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). Also, currency
depreciation increases the nominal value of debt dominated in foreign currency,
which raises financial leverage and limits the ability to obtain loans. The role of this
balance sheet effect is considered, for example, by Krugman (1999) and Bernanke
and Gertler (1989).10
Thus, firms’ access to capital from the host economy can be limited during
periods of sharp currency depreciation. Desai et al. (2008) emphasise that
multinational firms circumvent such financial constraints by receiving capital from
their parent companies. The question we ask here is: do all multinational affiliates
benefit from such an effect? The answer turned out to be no; only wholly-owned
affiliates do. During periods of currency crises, partially-owned German affiliates do
not seem to receive extra loans from their parent companies. Theoretically, in the
context of international tax planning Schindler and Schjelderup (2008) show that
partially-owned affiliates are less effective in using intra-company loans to
implement a tax efficient strategy than wholly-owned affiliates. The reason is that
the benefits are shared with all owners even though some co-owners did not
contribute to the funding of the plan. The same reasoning applies to periods of
crises.
Empirically, we employ the following baseline specification:
debtk;n;t ¼ aþ b1ðcrisisn;t  partiallykÞ þ b2ðtaxn;t  partiallykÞ
þ Czk;n;t þ gn;t þ ek;t ð2Þ
where the subscript k denotes each firm, n is a subscript for each country, and t is a
subscript for each year. The dependent variable, debt, is either the ratio of debt from
parent companies and related parties in Germany to total asset or the total-debt ratio
of the affiliate. The dummy crisis is equal to one if the host economy experiences a
sharp real currency depreciation (currency crisis) in that year as identified in Eq. 1
in Sect. 2.1. The dummy partially is equal to one if the affiliate is partially owned
and zero otherwise. The variable tax is the statutory corporate income tax rate of the
host economy. The vector zk,n,t is a vector of additional controls with associated
vector of the coefficients in C. The set of country-year fixed effects (gn,t) control for
all unobserved country-year specific macroeconomic factors. The error term is
denoted by ek,t. All standard errors are corrected for clustering at the country-year
level. As we are interested in the effects of currency crises, the empirical analysis in
this section is concentrated on emerging markets.
In this framework, since a currency crisis is a country-year event the
identification strategy is based on interaction terms between the ownership dummy
(a time-invariant firm-specific variable) and time variant country-specific
variables. Our main interest is the coefficient on the interaction term between
the crisis dummy and the partially-owned dummy b1, which we expect to be
negative. Further, one important factor in explaining the debt behaviour of
10 Empirically, Aguiar (2005) finds that firms with heavy exposure to short-run foreign currency debt
before the Mexican devaluation of the peso crisis in 1994 experience relatively low levels of post-
devaluation investment. Bleakley and Cowan (2008) examine firms in five Latin American countries and
find no support that those firms holding more dollar debt invest less than firms indebted in local currency.
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multinational affiliates is the tax rate. Since the interest payments on debt can be
deducted from taxes, firms rely more on debt financing than equity in an
environment of high taxes. Empirical evidence on such international debt shifting
strategies is provided for example by Huizinga et al. (2008) on European firms,
and Jog and Tang (2001) on firms operating in Canada. Multinational affiliates
can seek a tax shelter especially through loans from their parent companies. Our
aim here is to distinguish between multinational affiliates based on the ownership
structure. Do partially-owned affiliates exploit this strategy of debt shifting less
than wholly-owned affiliates? If the estimated sign of b2 is negative then the
answer is yes.
Table 2 presents the estimation results. In columns (1) to (5) the dependent
variable is the ratio of debt from parent companies and related parties in Germany to
total assets (loan-ratio). In column (1), the estimated b1 is negative and significant
suggesting that the loan ratio of a partially-owned affiliate is lower than that of a
wholly-owned affiliate by 2.5% points in a year of a currency crisis.
In column (2), we introduce the partially-owned dummy and interaction terms
between the partially-owned dummy and a vector of controls including the tax rate,
GDP, domestic credits to private sector as percent of GDP, the interest rate in the
host economy, and sales of the affiliates. The coefficient on the interaction term
between the depreciation dummy and the partially-owned dummy b1 is as expected
negative and significant. The estimated coefficient on the interaction term between
the partially-owned dummy and the tax rate b2 is also significant and negative
(-0.07). This indicates that partially-owned affiliates are less likely to employ a
tax efficient loan policy. In Sect. 3.3, we will scrutinise whether or not this finding
can be maintained in a sample of OECD countries.
A partial ownership structure can be decomposed into minority-owned and
majority-owned affiliates. In column (3), we introduce dummies capturing this
decomposition and multiply these dummies with the crisis dummy and the tax rate.
Both, the estimated coefficient on the variable ‘‘minority-owned 9 crisis’’ (-0.041)
and on the variable ‘‘majority-owned 9 crisis’’ (-0.028) are negative and
significant. The coefficient on ‘‘minority-owned 9 crisis’’ in absolute value is
larger though, indicating that minority-owned affiliates are particularly less inclined
to increase their ratios of loans from the parent firm in periods of crises. Further, the
evidence suggests that the loan ratio of minority-owned affiliates is not increasing in
the tax rate as indicated by an estimated coefficient of -0.112.
As a robustness check, instead of country-year fixed effects we employ in
columns (4) and (5) of Table 2 country, year and industry fixed effects. This allows
us to control for potential characteristics that are unique to a certain economic sector
within a country and year. In this setup, we can introduce time-variant country-
specific variables including the crisis dummy without interaction. The estimated
coefficient on the crisis dummy is positive and significant suggesting that in a year
of currency crisis the loan ratio of a wholly-owned affiliate increases by 2% points.
In contrast, the estimated b1 is as expected negative indicating that the increase in
loan ratio is only a feature of the loan ratio of wholly-owned affiliates but not of
partially-owned affiliates. According to the international debt shifting hypothesis the
loan ratio is expected to positively depend on the tax rate; the higher the tax rate the
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higher the benefits from financing through loans. Indeed, the estimated coefficient
on the tax rate is positive and significant. However, the estimated sign of b2 is
negative suggesting that partially-owned affiliates are less sensitive to the tax rate
than wholly-owned affiliates.
As a further robustness check, column (5) includes the same set of fixed effects
as in column (4) but in addition it contains interaction terms between the crisis
dummy and all control variables. The results are robust. b1 and b2 maintain their
sign and significance while most estimated coefficients on these interaction terms
are insignificant at a convenient level. The ratio of credits to the private sector to
GDP captures the liquidity of the financial market of the host economy.
Intuitively, high liquidity in the financial market of the host economy may
negatively affect the loan-ratio. Our estimates, however, are positive and
significant rejecting this intuition. German affiliates seem not to rely extensively
on the capital market of the host economy. Therefore, in the time of a credit boom
in the host economy they may demand more loans from their parents to keep up
with local competitors.11 Concerning the interest rate of the host economy, it is
insignificant in specification 4. However, in specification 5, the interest rate is
positive indicating that a high interest rate in the host economy leads to a higher
loan ratio from the parent firm.
Thus far, we have established that wholly-owned affiliates seem to receive
more loans from their parents than partially-owned affiliates during periods of
sharp real currency depreciation. An important question that arises is what
happens to the total debt ratio of both types of affiliates during periods of sharp
currency depreciation? In columns (1)–(5) of Table 3, we estimate the same set of
specifications as in columns (1)–(5) of Table 2 but use the total debt ratio as the
dependent variable. In all specifications, the total debt ratio of partially-owned
affiliates decreases in years of crises. With reference to columns (1)–(5) of
Table 2, most of this decrease is attributed to the decrease in loans from the
parent firm and related parties. In the case of wholly-owned affiliates however, the
reference group in specification (4) of Table 3 for example, the total debt ratio
increases during episodes of currency crises by a magnitude of 2.8% points.
Further, with regard to the total debt ratio, the estimates suggest that minority-
owned affiliates seem to be particularly financially less flexible in years of
currency rises as indicated by the coefficient of -0.054 in column (3). The
negative coefficients on the partially-owned dummy reported in specifications (1),
(2), (4) and (5) suggest that partially-owned affiliates are less indebted than
wholly-owned affiliates. Furthermore, unlike in the case of the intra-company loan
ratio, the effect of the tax rate on the total debt ratio is insignificant indicating that
tax sheltering through debt policy of multinational firms is especially achieved
through loans from the parent company and affiliated parties.
In sum, the results presented in this section point to two potential costs of shared
ownership. First, wholly-owned affiliates seem to be financially more flexible to
manage crises while the loan ratio of partially-owned affiliates decreases in periods
11 Some studies consider the other side of the issue, namely, the effects of FDI on the host market
financial development. See for example Harrison and McMillan (2003).
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of crises. Second, consistent with a tax efficient strategy, the intra-company loan
policy of wholly-owned affiliates is sensitive to the tax rate of the host economy
which is not the case for the loan policy of partially-owned affiliates.
3.2 Performance of multinational affiliates during periods of sharp currency
depreciation
The financial flexibility of multinational affiliates may affect their performance
during periods of currency crises. In this section, we consider the question: can we
observe differences in performance of both types of affiliates during currency
crises? The answer seems to depend on what do we mean by performance. We
examine two measures of performance, sales growth and employment growth,
within a similar empirical specification to the one presented in Eq. 2:
growthk;n;t ¼ aþ dðcrisisn;t  partiallykÞ þ Uqk;n;t þ gn;t þ ek;t ð3Þ
where growth is either sales growth or employment growth of the affiliate and is
measured as annual change. The vector U is a vector of coefficients corresponding
to the controls in qk,n,t. The error term is denoted by ek,t. In this specification, the
coefficient d is our main interest. A negative d would indicate a decline in the
performance of partially-owned affiliates in years of crises.
Table 4 displays the results. In terms of sales growth, columns (1)–(4), the results
suggest that wholly-owned affiliates manage to keep their sales unchanged during
periods of currency crises. The coefficient on the interaction term between the
partially-owned dummy and the crisis dummy (d) is negative and significant
indicating that sales of partially-owned affiliates decline during currency crises. For
example, the coefficient of -0.27 in column (1) indicates that partially-owned
affiliates’ sales growth in a year of crisis is 27% points lower than wholly-owned
affiliates’ sales growth. While in columns (1) and (2) we use country-year fixed
effects, as a robustness check we account for unobserved heterogeneity of affiliates
by using in column (3) a set of country-industry fixed effects and in column (4) a set
of affiliates and year fixed effects. The coefficient on the crisis dummy, although
negative, is insignificant indicating that wholly-owned affiliates manage to keep
their sales growth unaltered in episodes of sharp currency depreciations. However, d
remains negative and significant.
If performance is considered in terms of consequences for the employment of
the affiliate, in all specifications, the estimated coefficient on the interaction term
between the partially-owned dummy and the crisis dummy is insignificant.
Additionally, the results in columns (7) and (8) in Table 4 indicate a decrease in
the number of employees in crises periods of about 3% points regardless of the
ownership structure of the affiliate. This is not necessarily surprising. Domestic
co-owners of partially-owned affiliates in emerging markets may be keen on a
cautious rather than massive reduction in employment for social and political
reasons. Also, we do not have details of the type of employment contracts
prevailing across types of firms. It is possible that the cost of labour is higher for
wholly-owned multinational affiliates because they offer more insurance or higher
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wages etc. Unfortunately, we are not able to compare the reactions of employment
of domestic firms and employment of multinational affiliates during crises since
data on domestic firms are not available. For instance, it is possible that domestic
firms decrease employment by more than multinational affiliates do. Alvarez and
Go¨rg (2007) consider the employment response of multinational subsidiaries and
local firms in a period of economic slowdown in Chile, and find no evidence on
differential reactions between both types of firms.
3.3 International debt shifting: OECD countries
The previous sections have highlighted the lower financial flexibility of partially-
owned compared to wholly-owned affiliates operating in emerging markets. This
lower flexibility prevailed in reaction to currency crises as well as in response to
different tax incentives. One may ask the question: Do costs of shared ownership of
affiliates arise only in emerging markets? Clearly, due to the absence of currency
crises in major developed countries during the period 1996–2006 we cannot check
whether the differential flexibility to currency depreciations carries over to affiliates
located in OECD countries. It is possible, however, to compare affiliates’ responses
to tax rate differences across emerging and more developed countries. This is the
objective of the present section. From a theoretical point of view, Schindler and
Schjelderup (2008) put forward a model according to which the benefits of an
international debt shifting tax plan are shared with all owners even though some co-
owners did not contribute to the funding of the plan. Such externalities complicate
the implementation of a tax efficient strategy. Thus, joint ventures in this model are
less effective in tax planning than wholly-owned affiliates. As we will show
empirically ownership of affiliates in emerging and more affluent economies has a
very similar effect. Whether located in OECD countries or emerging markets, our
empirical evidence suggest that partially-owned affiliates react less sensitively to tax
rate differences than wholly-owned affiliates.
We employ in this section a similar empirical approach to the one used in Sect.
3.1 but on the entire sample and on the sample of OECD countries.12 Table 5
presents the results. The dependent variable is the ratio of debt to the parent
company and related parties to total assets, which is expected to positively depend
on the tax rate only in the case of wholly-owned affiliates.13 All specifications
include a vector of controls containing interaction terms between controls and the
ownership dummy(s). The controls are the logarithm of the GDP, the interest rate
in the host economy and the logarithm of sales of affiliates (results are not
reported). All reported standard errors are corrected for clustering at the country-
year level. The sample in columns (1)–(4) contains all countries. We restrain the
sample in columns (5)–(8) to include only OECD countries. The variable
12 In a related application, Mintz and Weichenrieder (2005, Chap. 5) study the ‘‘indirect’’ determinants of
outbound German FDI by splitting the sample into a wholly-owned sample and a partially-owned sample
without distinguishing between OECD and emerging markets. We prefer here to include a dummy
variable capturing the ownership structure, which enables us to directly compare the behaviour of both
types of affiliates.
13 Lehmann et al. (2004) examine the role of borrowing from the capital market of the host economy.
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‘‘partially-owned 9 tax rate’’ is estimated to have a negative sign in both samples
in all specifications. Considering the sample of all countries, in column (3) for
example, the coefficient on the tax rate is positive and significant at the 1% level
suggesting that a 10% increase in the tax rate increases the intra-company loan
ratio of wholly-owned affiliates by 15 percentage points. Very similar coefficients
in terms of the sign and the magnitude are found for the sample of OECD
countries; columns (6) and (7).
The upshot of the analysis presented in this section is that with regard to the
reaction of intra-company loan ratio to the tax rate there seem to be no differences
between affiliates operating in emerging markets and affiliates operating in OECD
economies. Wholly-owned multinational affiliates shift financing from equity to
intra-company loans in high tax countries in order to benefit from the deduction of
interest payments from the tax bill. Overall, the evidence shows that wholly-
owned affiliates rely more on international debt shifting than partially-owned
affiliates.
4 Conclusion
The empirical results documented in this paper are related to various strands in
the literature. We contribute to the literature on the cost of shared ownership by
considering the debt behaviour of German affiliates abroad and providing
evidence on two sorts of potential costs of shared ownership. First, during
periods of sharp currency depreciation the loan ratio of wholly-owned affiliates
increase. However, partially-owned affiliates, especially minority-owned affiliates,
are less likely to take advantage of their parent companies during periods of
sharp currency depreciation. This finding has a potential relevance for the
macroeconomic stabilisation effect of FDI in crises periods. It suggests that the
effect works especially through FDI loans to wholly-owned affiliates and
questions a stabilising role of FDI loans to minority-owned multinational firms.
Second, wholly-owned affiliates rely more on international debt shifting than
partially-owned affiliates. This indicates that partially-owned multinational
affiliates are restrained from fully exploiting a tax minimising strategy. While
the lower financial flexibility of partially-owned affiliates during currency crises
could only be tested for a set of emerging countries, the analysis of tax effects
has shown that there are no systematic differences between affiliates in emerging
markets and OECD countries. In both sets of countries, ownership is similarly
important.
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